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Special interests attempt to influence lawmakers through campaign contributions and through informational 
lobbying. Both avenues have been explored extensively in theoretical models. Only the former, however, 
has received much empirical scrutiny. We provide the first empirical tests of the major class of models of 
costly legislative lobbying, the Potters-van Winden-Grossman-Helpman (PWGH) model. To do so, we 
extend a simple PWGH model to encompass situations in which a legislature adjusts a pre-existing policy 
only periodically. We then test predictions of the model using data derived from over 50,000 observations 
of annual lobbying expenditures by special interest groups in the American states. We find that, as 
predicted, special interest groups 1) increase lobbying expenditures when the legislature is controlled by 
“enemies” rather than by “friends”; 2) increase lobbying expenditures in budget years in states with 
biennial budgeting, relative to budget years in states with annual budgeting; and, 3) increasingly exit the 
lobbying process as lobbying costs rise.  Overall, the results provide substantial empirical support for the 
PWGH class of signaling models of interest group lobbying in legislative settings. 
    1 
 
1. Introduction 
One of the primary instruments that special interests use to influence lawmakers is 
information. Information about the likely popularity, efficacy, distributional impact, cost, 
and legality of programs is extremely valuable to re-election-oriented legislators. Not 
surprisingly, multitudes of professional lobbyists gather whenever legislatures convene, 
whether in Washington or in state capitols.   
As a practical matter lobbying requires the expenditure of money to pay lobbyists, 
maintain offices, commission studies, hire experts, and so on.  In addition, as discussed 
below, such expenditures can enhance the credibility of information transmission. Thus, 
one may gain at least a rough measure of the significance of lobbying by examining the 
volume of lobbying expenditures. At the U.S. federal level, annual lobbying expenditures 
in the late 1990s totaled about $1.5 billion. By way of comparison, in the same period 
expenditures on campaign contributions totaled about $300 million annually (Milyo et al 
2000).  Perhaps surprisingly, lobbying, not campaign contributions, absorbs the bulk of 
“influence dollars” spent by special interest groups. 
The theoretical foundations of campaign expenditures and lobbying have both 
been explored extensively; we review the latter shortly. But only the theory of campaign 
expenditures has been investigated in much depth empirically. Notable papers testing 
models of campaign contributions include (inter alia) papers such as Goldberger and 
Maggi (1999) and Snyder (1992). In contrast, very few papers test formal models of   2 
informational lobbying.
1 Perhaps most prominently, Austen-Smith and Wright (1994) 
tests a model of cheap-talk lobbying, using data on lobbying activity during a single 
Supreme Court nomination. To the best of our knowledge, no paper empirically 
investigates the predictions of models of endogenous cost lobbying.  
In this paper we empirically test predictions from the most prominent model of 
endogenous cost lobbying, the Potters-van Winden-Grossman-Helpman (PWGH) model. 
To do so, we employ some of the most extensive data yet collected on lobbying 
expenditures by special interest groups, distinct from campaign contributions. The data 
were collected from ethics commissions in the American states and include time series of 
aggregate expenditure data from 38 states as well as group-specific annual lobbying 
expenditures in each of twelve states, over 50,000 observations. We examine both sets of 
data.  In addition, using the group-specific data, we construct panel data for groups 
operating in multiple states. The states involved employed a variety of legislative 
institutions, with varying political control and composition. This variation allows us to 
examine how legislative design and control affects lobbying expenditures independent of 
group-specific effects.  
As we discuss below, the PWGH models predict that special interest groups 
increase lobbying expenditures when the legislature is controlled by “enemies” rather 
than by “friends”; increase lobbying expenditures in budget years in states with biennial 
budgeting, not only relative to non-budget years but relative to budget years in states with 
annual budgeting; and increasingly exit the lobbying process as lobbying costs rise. We 
                                                 
1There is an extensive descriptive literature on legislative lobbying, ranging from how-to manuals 
(Krasnow, Siddall, and Berg 2001), to qualitative case studies (Hrebenar and Thomas 1993), to statistical 
analysis of  the number of lobbyist registrations across the states (Lowery and Gray 2000) or counts of 
federal lobbying reports filed with the Clerk of the House (Leech et al 2005).     3 
find strong support for all these predictions. The predicted effects are substantively large, 
statistically significant, and robust to changes in specification and corrections for 
potential specification errors. Overall, the results provide substantial empirical support 
for the PWGH class of signaling models of interest group lobbying in legislative settings.  
The paper is organized in the following way. Section 2 describes the data. Section 
3 reviews the PWGH class of models and modestly extends them to encompass situations 
when a legislature changes pre-existing policy only periodically, as occurs in states with 
biennial budgeting. Several clear and rather distinctive predictions emerge. Section 4 uses 
the state data to investigate the PWGH predictions in a series of empirical tests. Section 5 
discusses the findings and concludes. An Appendix contains proofs and additional 
empirical details. 
2. The Lobbying Expenditure Data   
The Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 provided data to scholars on lobbying 
expenditures at the federal level.  But many state legislatures had already or concurrently 
passed similar legislation, creating state ethics commissions that collected substantial 
data on lobbying expenditures.  Thus, extensive data now exists about lobbying 
expenditures in the American states.  However, little of this data has been collected and 
analyzed heretofore.  
We exploit the state ethics commission data to create three distinct data sets. The 
first comprises annual aggregate lobbying expenditures by all interest groups in a state in 
all states where such data had been kept for at least three years as reported in early 2005, 
thirty-eight states in all.  Table 1 provides a list of the states, and the time periods for   4 
which the data is available and employed in this paper. This data yields 408 state-year 
observations.
2   
 
****INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE**** 
 
  The second and more detailed data set consists of annual lobbying expenditures 
by individual interest groups in a panel of twelve states: Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, 
Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Montana, New Jersey, Oregon, Virginia, 
Washington and Wisconsin.  These states were chosen on the basis of data quality and 
availability.  The individual interest group data encompasses more than 50,000 interest-
group-state-year observations with positive expenditures on lobbying. The time periods 
in the panel average over six years but range from four years to ten years (see Table A1).
3 
Each state averages just over 4,000 observations. 
  A third dataset is derived from this second.  It consists of a panel of just over 
5,155 interest group-state-year observations.  In order to be included in this subsample, 
the interest group must be a firm or union and must have lobbied in more than one budget 
year in multiple states in the panel.
4   There are 590 interest groups which meet these 
criteria.  This sample frame is largely driven by the theory, which is discussed below. 
                                                 
2 For idiosyncratic reasons, three states have series that stop in 2001.  The Center for Public Integrity 
maintains a data base of this kind, but with much shorter panels (none before 1995).  We have also found 
significant inconsistency in the data within some states in the CPI data. 
3 Typical data from an ethics commission consisted of expenditures by a lobbyist on behalf of a client (a 
group). Determining expenditures by group required carefully matching and assembling expenditures 
across lobbyists, a laborious procedure.  
4 In order to create congruence with the classification of campaign contributors used the Federal Elections 
Commission (FEC), we classified groups into four categories: membership organizations (e.g., AARP, 
ACLU, Sierra Club), firms (e.g., GE, Merck), trade associations (e.g., Pharmaceutical Manufacturers’ 
Association (PHARMA)), and unions (e.g., United Auto Workers). In addition to these four categories, we   5 
An obvious issue with the disclosure data is that reporting requirements differ 
across states. Hence, simple cross-state differences in lobbying expenditures may largely 
reflect different legal requirements for reporting expenditures. Accordingly, in the 
statistical analyses in the paper, to control for different reporting requirements as well as 
other time-invariant unmeasured characteristics, we employ state or interest group fixed 
effects whenever possible. 
To provide an overview of the most striking feature of the data, Figure 1 displays 
annual lobbying expenditures in three states with important variation in legislative 
processes: New York, Wisconsin, and Oregon.  New York has annual regular sessions 
and annual budgeting, Wisconsin has annual regular sessions but biennial budgeting, and 
Oregon has biennial regular sessions and biennial budgeting.   
 
****INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE**** 
 
The figure suggests a close relationship between lobbying and the budget cycle. 
In particular, Oregon’s and Wisconsin’s lobbying expenditures increase substantially in 
budget years, and drop in off-budget years, resulting in a saw-tooth pattern in 
expenditures. New York, with annual budgeting, displays no such pattern, however it 
suggests there may be non-stationarity in the data (which we will address later in the 
                                                                                                                                                 
identified a fifth category—government—because it is common for governmental organizations (e.g., city 
and county governments, school districts, sanitation districts) to lobby the state legislature as well. (These 
groups are not permitted to provide campaign contributions, and hence do not appear in the FEC 
classification system.)  Each group in the data base was classified into one of these five categories, using 
supplemental information from web searches when necessary. 
   6 
paper). Finally, comparing Oregon to Wisconsin, it appears that regular sessions 
engender more lobbying effort than special sessions.  
Because previous studies focused exclusively on the federal level, where 
budgeting is annual, the link between lobbying and budgeting seems to have escaped the 
notice of analysts. But the pattern is not difficult to understand.  Budgeting forces 
reconsideration (if only nominally) of policy in virtually every arena in which a 
government is active. Budgeting thus affords a regular opportunity for aggressive 
claimants to make new or expanded bids on the public fisc. It also creates a threat – at 
least potentially – to the rents of virtually every vested interest, as well as the potential 
for taxation by the state government and thus rent dissipation for the interest group. In 
contrast, legislative action outside the institutionalized budget process requires substantial 
and sustained investments of time and effort by legislative entrepreneurs (Arnold 1990). 
Even modest changes must negotiate a torturous path through multiple, stringent veto 
points (Krehbiel 1998). Accordingly, serious change in existing policies, or innovation of 
new ones, is rare (Baumgartner and Jones 1992, Mayhew 1991). Because there is little 
reason to lobby when the status quo appears inviolable, and considerable reason to do so 
when the status quo seems vulnerable, it is no surprise state data reveal a close link 
between lobbying expenditures and budget years in states with biennial budgeting. 
Because regular sessions afford greater scope for legislative action than special sessions, 
lobbying expenditures predictably are greater in the former than the latter. 
To insure that this is not merely a spurious correlation, we briefly present a 
multivariate statistical analysis confirming the patterns on display in the figure (see Table 
2).   A battery of augmented Dickey-Fuller and Fisher tests indicate that some of the   7 
longer time series of expenditures, like New York, are not stationary.  First differences 
eliminates the non-stationarity in each and every state.
 5  Thus, the reported regressions 
are differences-in-differences regressions.
6  
We employ a number of independent variables (Table A2 defines each variable 
and indicates its source.) These include indicator variables for a budget year and election 
year for the state legislature.  We also include variables that measure the number of days 
the legislature met in regular session and special session in that year. We characterize the 
makeup of the state government as unified Republican, unified Democratic, or divided 
government.  All variables are differenced within state.  In addition, we control for per 
capita income in the state, and, in all the regressions, use state fixed effects for the 38 
states. 
 
****INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE**** 
 
In Table 2 we use two different dependent variables: the difference in the log of 
annual, per capita interest group lobbying expenditures and the difference in the log of 
annual interest group lobbying expenditures.  A positive coefficient on a variable means 
                                                 
5 The results of the ADF tests on the levels and differenced data are available from the authors.  
6 We have considered a number of different specifications.  For each of two dependent variables, log of 
lobbying per capita in a state, and log of total lobbying in a state, we have run the analysis on a) levels on 
levels with state fixed effects for only those states with stationary series, b) on all states with state fixed 
effects with corrections for AR-1, c) on all states using the Arellano-Bond Dynamic Panel estimation 
techniques, and d) differences on differences using dummies for session and special session instead of 
number of days.  All of these methods yield remarkably similar results to those presented in Table 2.  
[NOTE TO REFEREES:  PLEASE SEE REFEREE APPENDIX, TABLE R1 FOR A TABLE 
PROVIDING THE RESULTS OF THESE ALTERNATIVE SPECIFICATIONS.] 
 
9 Krishna and Morgan 2001 and Battaglini 2004 illustrate recent analyses and provide citations to key 
papers.   8 
an increase in the variable increases the difference in the amount of lobbying within a 
state relative to mean level of lobbying for that state; a negative coefficient means an 
increase in the variable of interest decreases the difference in the amount of lobbying.  
Standard errors of the coefficients are listed in parenthesis below the coefficient 
estimates.  Statistical significance at the 99%, 95%, and 90% level are noted.   
The results across the two models are nearly identical.  Each 10 day change in the 
length of the legislative session results in 6% increase in the lobbying rates.   The most 
pronounced effect, however, concerns budget years.  Special interests increase their 
lobbying efforts substantially during budget years.  The 23% increase in lobbying during 
budget years is robust across both specifications and statistically significant at the 99% 
level of confidence, controlling for other factors. The patterns shown in Figure 1 seem to 
be characteristic of broad patterns in the American states.  
Having established the importance of the budget cycle to lobbying effort in this 
exploratory analysis, we wish to use this fact and variation in the institutional structures 
across the states to explore the validity of models of endogenous cost lobbying. We now 
turn to theory 
 
3. Endogenous Cost Lobbying: Theory 
Advice-giving by interested or biased parties has spawned a large and complex 
theoretical literature. Within this literature, existing models fall into two broad classes: 
cheap-talk models, in which a biased expert transmits information using a costless signal, 
and expenditure models, in which a biased expert pays to communicate.  The first class of 
models, initiated by Crawford and Sobel (1982), is by far the more extensive. The key   9 
research question is typically the specificity or truthfulness of the information supplied by 
the advisor or advisors.
9 Because our interest is expenditures on lobbying, however, we 
focus on the second class of models.  
The lobby expenditure literature distinguishes two situations. In the first, the 
costly activism situation, the advisor pays a fee to engage in advocacy or acquire 
information. Lohmann (1993), for example, examines demonstrations by voters whose 
“fee” is the cost of participating in the demonstration. Grossman and Helpman (2001: 
Section 5.1) examines lobbying with exogenous fees. In Bennedsen and Feldmann 
(2002), a group pays to acquire district-level information and then assists a legislator in 
building a majority coalition. In Battaglini and Benabou (2003), multiple imperfectly 
informed advisors play a strategic participation game with each other; participating 
requires paying a fee. In this class of models, expenditures often are a small (usually 
exogenously determined) flat fee.
10 The focus of the analysis usually involves the micro-
details of lobbying (e.g., which groups interact how much or how truthfully with which 
decision maker) or the response of the decision maker to increased levels of advocacy. 
Thus, data on aggregate expenditures by groups is poorly suited for testing these models. 
The second group of lobbying expenditure models examines situations with 
endogenous spending. In these models, an observable, endogenously chosen expenditure 
level provides information about the group’s private information. These models adapt the 
“standard” technology of costly signaling to a political setting. This type of analysis was 
initiated by Potters and Van Winden (1992) and Austen-Smith (1995) and extended in 
                                                 
10 In Durr and Swank 2005, the advisor chooses an expenditure level in order to become better informed, 
but the expenditure level is assumed to be hidden from outside observers so that it does not signal the 
extent or quality of her private information.   10 
Grossman and Helpman (2001: Section 5.2).
11  Data on groups’ lobbying expenditures 
appears well-suited for testing this type of model, with one caveat. The base case in the 
endogenous spending framework involves a single signaler. In fact, because the signaler 
is perfectly informed about the policy-relevant information and separating equilibria 
exist, there is little real room for multiple signalers (for a discussion see Grossman and 
Helpman 2001: 163  ff.) Extending the PWGH framework to include partially informed 
groups who engage in strategic action within and across coalitions of signalers would be 
a significant theoretical departure.
12 Moreover, since the expenditure data is not issue-
specific in any event, new propositions would probably not be testable with current data. 
Accordingly, in what follows we abstract from strategic interactions within or across 
coalitions of special interest groups to focus on the core comparative static predictions of 
the PWGH endogenous spending framework. However, we do need to extend the PWGH 
framework to encompass rational lobbying when the status quo receives only periodic 
reconsideration.  
We proceed as follows. First, we review the basic framework, which we see as 
applicable in states with annual policy making due to annual budgeting. We then consider 
lobbying in the off-budget year of states with biennial budgeting. Here, because of the 
costliness of legislative action, the status quo is privileged absent a compelling reason for 
change. Finally, we consider rational lobbying in budget years for states with biennial 
budgeting.  In the past, the state’s policy receives active reconsideration but actors 
                                                 
11 Austen-Smith 1995 differs significantly from the other two models, in that the expenditure is a campaign 
contribution signaling the group’s preferences rather than any policy-relevant information per se. In the 
model, the group acquires policy-relevant information subsequent to its costly signal and then engages in 
cheap talk lobbying. 
12 Battaglini and Benabou 2003 takes a step in this direction.   11 
anticipate that whatever policy emerges will likely remain in place for some time. In the 
model, lobbyists modify their behavior accordingly; in particular, the SIG must lobby 
more aggressively. We conclude the section by detailing testable propositions about 
lobbying expenditures under different political configurations and across states with 
different institutional arrangements.   
A. The Basic Model: Lobbying Under Annual Budgeting 
In the basic PWGH framework, a legislature (G) has public policy preferences 
that depend on the state of the world, a random variable θ .  A special interest group 
(SIG) has preferences over θ  as well, though in any state of the world the SIG may 
prefer higher (or lower) levels of the policy relative to the legislator.  In this sense, the 
SIG is “biased.” The SIG, knowingθ , signals this private information to the decision 
maker by expending money on lobbying. Within the basic framework, G sets policy de 
novo, based upon its beliefs about θ  after observing the SIG’s expenditure.  
The policy space is the non-negative real line with + ℜ = ∈P p . States of the world 
are a continuous random variable θ
~
drawn from [ ] max min,θ θ = Θ ,  0 min ≥ θ . The utility 
function of the policy maker is 
( )
2 ) ; ( θ θ − − = p p G  
While that of the SIG is: 
( ) l p p l U − − − − =
2 ) , ; , ( δ θ δ θ  
 
Where l denotes a monetary expenditure by the SIG.    12 
The degree of SIG bias is parameterized as δ , which is common knowledge, 
making the SIG’s ideal point  δ θ + . Thus, if δ is positive the SIG wishes a somewhat 
higher policy than does the policymaker for any state of the world (positive bias), but if 
δ is negative, the SIG wishes a somewhat lower one (negative bias). We will associate 
positive bias with “liberal” groups and negative bias with “conservative” ones. Note that 
bias is defined relative to the legislature (that is, the median voter in the legislature). 
The sequence of play is: 1) Nature draws θ  using common knowledge 
distribution  ) (θ F ; 2) the SIG (costlessly) learns θ  and publicly burns money l; 3) the 
legislature sets policy p.  
We note here that “publicly burning money” is not necessarily required in a literal 
sense.  The lobbyist could, for example, hire more expensive lobbyists or experts to 
makes its case, or could invest in expensive reports and spend more money to make its 
case to the legislature.  The key requirements are a) the amount of money that the 
lobbyist spends is endogenous and chosen by the lobbyist, rather than exogenously 
determined, and b) the legislator knows the amount of money the lobbyist has spent. 
A strategy for the SIG is a function mapping states of the world into expenditures, 
+ ℜ → Θ : l . A strategy for the policy maker is a function mapping expenditures into 
policy,  P r → ℜ+ : . An obvious but important point is that, in any equilibrium, the policy 
maker will set p to θ  if it knows it.   13 
Grossman and Helpman focus on the following perfect Bayesian equilibrium, a 
fully separating equilibrium.
13  We begin by analyzing the equilibrium for positive bias of 
the SIG (the superscript distinguishes positive bias strategies from negative bias ones): 
( ) min min 2 ) , , ( θ θ δ θ θ δ − =
+ l  
min min 2
) ( ) , , ( θ
δ
θ δ + = =
+ l
l r l p  
Beliefs are determined by Bayes Rule whenever possible. In words, a SIG with positive 
bias burns no money if the state of the world is the lowest possible value. Otherwise, it 
increases expenditures linearly. The policy maker simply inverts the lobby expenditure 
function to find the state of the world (which it then knows with certainty), and sets 
policy to match the state of the world. 
Since the policy maker’s strategy yields it the highest possible utility in any state 
of the world it clearly has no incentive to deviate from its prescribed strategy, which 
follows directly from its beliefs given the signal. The more difficult issue involves the 
SIG, who might have an incentive to inflate its report about the state of the world. 
However, the expenditure schedule is constructed to prevent this from happening. To see 















                                                 
13 There are other equilibria. For example: SIG never burns money, G interprets any money burned as a 
mistake uncorrelated with the state of the world. (This is possible, as burned money is off the equilibrium 
path.) Either no information is transmitted, or the game reduces to the cheap talk game.    14 





θ θ δ l − −
. For all min θ θ > , this marginal 
gain is positive up to  ) ( 2 min θ θ δ − = l and negative thereafter. Thus, the SIG has no 
incentive to deviate from its strategy. 
We also consider the case of negative bias of the SIG, which occurs when 
Democratic legislatures are lobbied by conservative groups and possibly Republican 
legislatures lobbied by ultraconservatives.  It is straightforward to construct the analogous 
separating equilibrium in the case of negative bias: 
( ) max 2 ) ( θ θ δ θ − =






l r p + = =
−  
(Because δ is negative, the indicated expenditure function yields positive levels of 
expenditures.) Here, the SIG spends no money if the state of the world has its highest 
value, but otherwise spends money to drive policy down. 
  From an empirical point of view, perhaps the most striking feature of the 
equilibrium strategies is that the logarithm of expenditures is linear in a measure of 
ideological bias between the SIG and policy maker. In other words, if the SIG’s bias 
relative to the legislature is small, it need not burn much money to persuade the policy 
maker aboutθ . But if its bias is large, it must burn more money. This relationship is 
shown in Figure 2.   
 
*** INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE *** 
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B:  Extension: Biennial Budgeting 
1.  Lobbying In Off-Budget Years in Biennial States  
The PWGH model makes predictions about lobbying expenditures in states that 
set policy de novo. But it does not indicate how lobbying will proceed when there is 
substantial stickiness in a pre-existing status quo policy in some time periods, such as in 
off-budget years in states with biennial budgeting.  We modify and extend the PWGH 
model to include two periods, a budgeting period and non-budgeting period. In the 
former policy is easy to change; in the latter, it is not.  
Suppose there is a status quo policy in place at time 1,  1 1 θ = p , and the politician 
faces a cost of legislating at time 2,  2 k , to set new policy 2 p .  The cost of legislating in 
off-budget years in biennial states reflects the lack of an automatic procedure for 
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Two obvious implications arise.  First, if the policy maker knew 2 θ , it would not 
legislate unless  2 θ  were sufficiently far from  1 θ . More specifically, in such a situation the 
legislature will set  2 2 θ = p  if it legislates, so that the relevant comparison is 
()
2
2 1 θ θ − − versus  2 k − , implying: do not legislate if  [ ] 2 1 2 1 2 , k k + − ∈ θ θ θ  .    16 
Second, if the policy maker will not legislate, the SIG should not burn money since doing 
so only brings a loss.  
We can now indicate an equilibrium that is similar to that constructed above (in 
fact, as  0 → k the two become identical) where beliefs are determined by Bayes Rule 
wherever possible. Retention of the status quo means no policy change (so no 
expenditure of k):  
 
1. If  0 > δ (positive bias) 
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2. If  0 < δ (negative bias) 
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  Figure 3 indicates lobbying expenditure as a function of the state of the world in 
the off-budget year, showing the “hole” created by costly movement of policy in off-
budget years. The hole indicates that for those values of  2 θ , the SIG will not lobby   17 
because doing so will fail to move policy.  Note that lobbying expenditure as a function 
of bias would appear identical to Figure 2, unless the SIG knew that  2 θ  fell in the “hole,” 
in which case lobbying expenditure would be zero.  
 
*** INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE *** 
 
  The “hole” has obvious empirical implications: on average we would expect to 
see fewer groups lobbying in off-budget years than on budget years.  
 
2. Lobbying in Budget Years in Biennial States 
Finally, we turn to lobbying in budget years in biennial states.  To do this, we 
consider a two period model in which period 1 is the budget year while period 2 is the 
off-budget year. Clearly, strategies in period 2 will be those identified in the previous 
section (budgeting in off-years in biennial states). The task for the legislature in period 1, 
then, is to set 1 p , anticipating rational play in period 2. We assume the cost of legislating 
in period 1, 1 k , is zero because the budget process institutionalizes (many times 
constitutionally) consideration of policy.  
A basic intuition is that if second period costs are low, first period policy will 
mostly reflect the first period state of the world  1 θ . But if second period costs are high so 
subsequent action is unlikely, optimal first period policy involves a tradeoff between the 
first period state of the world  1 θ   and expectations about the second period state of the 
world,  2 θ . Thus, the legislature will down-weight extreme first period states of the world,   18 
relative to a regime where it will recast policy annually. In turn, the first period lobbying 
expenditure function will need to reflect this. 
Equilibrium strategies can be derived straightforwardly via backward induction. 
In particular, the second period strategies are simply those derived in the preceding 
section.  Given  1 θ  and  2 k , the expected value of play in the second period may be found 
for each  1 p . Then, the best  1 p may be found for each  1 θ  and  2 k .  Finally, a first period 
lobbying function may be found that assures revelation of  1 θ  ( 2 k  is assumed common 
knowledge). In the Mathematical Appendix, we employ this procedure to find 
equilibrium strategies for all values of  1 θ  and  2 k . Here we report these results, focusing 
on the positive bias case. Throughout this section we assume  2 θ  is drawn from a uniform 
distribution on the unit interval.  
 
**** INSERT FIGURE 4 HERE *** 
 
Figure 4 indicates optimal first period policy for all values of  1 θ  and  2 k .  As 
shown, there are four distinct cases. In the first, shown as Region I,  2 k is very high 
relative to the value of 1 θ , so much so that the legislature will not change policy in the 
second period regardless of the realization of 2 θ . We do not expect to see this equilibrium 
because while  2 k  may be high, the governor in all states has the right to call a special 
session of the legislature.  This somewhat mitigates the possibility of an extraordinarily 
high  2 k .  Though calling a special session is costly, it makes extremely high values of  2 k  
unobserved in the American states.    19 
In the second case, labeled Region II in the figure,  2 k  is moderate or low while 
1 θ is moderate. Given the cost of movement in the second period, the legislature expects 
to alter a moderate 1 p  if, but only if,  2 θ takes an unusually high or low value. In this case, 
optimal policy is simply to set  1 p  equal to  1 θ .  
In the third case, shown as Region III in the figure,  2 k  is moderate but  1 θ  is 
unusually low. Given the cost of moving in the second period, the legislature expects a 
low first period policy to persist absent an unusually high second period 2 θ . The optimal 
policy increases in  1 θ but always lies above it – the legislature somewhat down-weighs 
first period θ . The fourth case(shown as Region IV) is similar, but involves moderate 2 k  
and very high 1 θ . The optimal policy increases in  1 θ but always lies below it – the 
legislature somewhat down-weighs first period θ . 
Given the legislature’s responses to  1 θ and  2 k , it is possible to derive the lobby 
expenditure function that forces the SIG to reveal its information. These are shown in 
Figure 5.  
 
*** INSERT FIGURE 5 HERE *** 
 
  From an empirical perspective, a notable feature of the lobbying expenditure 
functions is that, except for the unobserved “high k” scenario, all involve policy biasδ  
plus legislating cost  2 k . The addition of the latter term contrasts with the lobbying 
expenditure function in annual states. The effect of  2 k is to increase lobbying effort in   20 
budget years of states with biennial budgeting, relative to lobbying in states with  annual 
budgeting.  
  Thus, the PWGH framework yields three key predictions which can be tested in 
the data.  The most basic prediction is that the greater the bias, δ, the more money the 
SIG will have to burn to convince the legislator to adopt is chosen policy.  Second, there 
will be an increase lobbying effort in budget years of states with biennial budgeting, 
relative to lobbying in states with annual budgeting.  Finally, a number of groups will fall 
into the “hole” during off-budget years, causing the number of interest groups lobbying to 
shrink during this time.  We test these three main predictions of the model using the state 
level lobbying data. 
 
4. Data Analysis 
In order to test the implications of the PWGH model, we conduct three sets of 
analyses.  We start by discussing the econometric challenges in estimating the predictions 
of the PWGH model.  We then examine the effect bias and ideological distance on the 
amount of endogenous lobbying expenditures that occur.  Using a two-stage estimation 
procedure, we turn our efforts to estimating the effect of biennial budgeting on lobbying 
effort.  Finally, we turn to an examination of the effect of budget cycles on interest group 
entry and exit in the lobbying process. 
      21 
A.  Estimating The Lobby Equation 
We begin by returning to the lobbying expenditure equations for states with annual 
budgeting and the lobby equations in budget years for states with biennial budgeting.
15 
Recall that these are:  
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While stopping well short of a structural estimation, given (AA) and (AB) we consider 
the following an obvious candidate for an estimating equation for lobbying expenditures 
of group i in state j at time t:  
ijt ijt ijt v d c k b a l + + + = ) ln( ) ln( ) ln(                                      (1) 
where k is a proxy for legislation costs in the off-budget year in biennial states only, and 
ijt d is a measure of absolute ideological distance from group i to the state government in 
state j in year t (a measure of bias, θ ) with an additive error term  ijt v . 
In this subsection, we limit our sample frame to all firms and unions that have 
positive lobbying expenditures in a given year in a given state, using a subset of the 
dataset of 12 states with 50,000 interest group-state-year observations. These groups 
seem natural choices, since their interests frequently have an ideological dimension (i.e., 
liberal, conservative) and they are frequently allied with the major political parties 
                                                 
15 In the latter case, we focus on the most likely of the four scenarios shown in Figure 4 that in the lower 
center portion of the figure.   22 
(Democrats for labor, Republicans for firms). These two groups also provide an 
abundance of observations. We limit our analysis to interest groups that lobby in multiple 
states so that we can separate our interest group fixed effects from state fixed effects. We 
further limit our observation set to only those years when regularly scheduled budgeting 
occurs in the state.  So, in annual budgeting states, this observation set is all years; in 
biennial budgeting states, it is only budgeting years. The net result is 5,515 interest 
group-year-state observations for analysis.  This is the second dataset referred to in 
Section 2. 
We could follow the specification directly from equations (AA) and (AB).  To do 
this, we would use the log of lobbying expenditures by each interest group as the 
dependent variable.   To proxy for k, we use a dummy variable which is equal to one for 
states with biennial budgeting, and zero otherwise.  To measure absolute distance d we 
create a distance variable.  This variable measures the ideological distance of the firm 
(union) to the legislature.  The distance is coded as 0 for a firm if the government (house, 
senate, and governor) is entirely Republican, and 0 for a union if the government is 
entirely Democratic.  It is coded as 0.5 for both firms and unions if there is divided 
government.  And it is coded as a 1 for the firm if the government is unified Democratic, 
and 1 for a union if the government is entirely Republican.
16   
                                                 
16 Note that this coding imposes the restriction that the expenditure function slope is the same for a given 
group between unified opposed and divided government, and between divided government and unified 
supporting government.     23 
The results of such an analysis can be found in Appendix A3.
17  Although the 
such a regression yields results supportive of the PWGH model, (large positive and 
statistically significant coefficients for both the parameters b and c in Eq. (1)), a statistical 
concern looms.  As noted earlier, laws regarding lobbying disclosure requirements differ 
substantially across states.  In states such as Wisconsin, one must disclose compensation 
levels for hired lobbyists, while in states such as Georgia, such compensation is not part 
of the disclosure process.  Given this heterogeneity in state disclosure laws, one would 
ideally like to use state fixed effects.  The problem that arises, though, is that states do not 
change their budgeting procedures.
19  Thus, biennial budgeting does not vary over time 
within state, causing there to be a lack of identification in the econometric estimation 
when both state fixed effects and the biennial budgeting variable are included. 
 
B.  ESTIMATING THE EFFECT OF BIAS 
Given the importance of state fixed effects to any estimation, we proceed with the 
dataset, dropping the biennial variables and using state fixed effects.  The dependent 
variable is still the log of lobbying expenditures for group i, in state j, at time t.  Table 3 
presents the results.  Models 1 through 5 present results with levels on levels.  Model 1 
uses no fixed effects, Model 2 adds group fixed effects, Model 3 adds time-varying 
control variables, Model 4 adds state fixed effects, and Model 5 adds year fixed effects. 
                                                 
17 Table A3 in the appendix presents the results using the variables of interest.  Model 1 incorporates group 
fixed-effects and Model 2 adds some control variables not included in the model, log of the population 
level and log of per capita personal income in the state.  In both specifications, the coefficients on biennial 
budgeting and on distance are positive, as predicted by the model, and statistically significant at the 99% 
level of confidence or greater.     
19 See the note on Table 1 for a further discussion.   24 
 
*** INSERT TABLE 3 HERE *** 
 
The coefficient on distance is positive and statistically significant at the 99% level 
in all specifications.  The inclusion of state fixed effects in Models 4 and 5 causes the size 
of the coefficient on distance to drop by almost half, but it remains positive.  
Substantively, Model 5, with the group, state, and year fixed effects and control variables, 
estimates there is a 38% increase in lobbying by firms (unions) when the government 
switches from being unified Republican (Democratic) to unified Democratic 
(Republican).  Longer special sessions (but not regular sessions) also result in statistically 
more lobbying, with each additional 10 legislative days giving rise to 5% more lobbying 
expenditures by special interests.   
In Models 6 through 10, we replicate the five earlier models using a differences 
on differences estimator.
20  Models 7 through 10 include group, state, and/or year fixed 
effects as noted, as well.  In Model 10, all coefficients are statistically significant at the 
99% level and all, except the coefficient on Population, have the same sign as in Model 5.  
The magnitude of the coefficient on Distance is somewhat larger than Model 5.  It means 
that there is a 74% increase in lobbying by firms (unions) when the government switches 
from being unified Republican (Democratic) to unified Democratic (Republican).  There 
is only a 7% increase in lobbying with each additional ten legislative days in the session.  
That is, a shift in unified government has almost the same effect as adding 105 session 
                                                 
20 This specification addresses concerns of non-stationarity of the time series.   25 
days to the legislative calendar.  The effect for special sessions is the same as regular 
sessions in this specification. 
One concern that may arise is that while the PWGH model focuses on one group, 
it does not address the question of strategic behavior (or something as simple as free-
riding) when there are multiple groups.  As discussed earlier, we do not model the 
strategic interaction between groups for a variety of reasons.  However, empirically, we 
can examine whether the number of groups in an issue area makes a difference to a 
group’s lobbying.  We replicate Model 5 including a variable for the number of interest 
groups lobbying in the same issue area.
21  In this specification, the coefficient on this new 
variable is positive but not statistically significant.   
 
C.  ESTIMATING THE EFFECT OF BUDGETING 
To capture the effects of the budget cycle, we can decompose the state fixed 
effects with cross section regressions (Card and Krueger 1992).  The state fixed effects 
include all effects that do not vary within state.  Thus, whether a state budgets biennially 
or annually is captured in the state fixed effect.  We would normally run a regression of 
the estimated state fixed effects on the covariates that vary across state but not over time 
within state.  Unfortunately, because micro interest group data is available for only 
twelve states, such an approach is not feasible. 
                                                 
21 Gray et al (2002) have classified each registered lobbyist in each state according to one of twenty areas 
of interest, as of 1997.  We update this and classify all interest groups in the dataset using their 
classification system, and we also add ten categories to further refine the analysis.   26 
However, what we can do is to take aggregate level data of interest group 
lobbying by state and year (the data used in Section 2), and conduct a similar test.
22  In 
the first stage we use the state-year aggregate lobbying data for only those years in which 
budgeting occurred.  Appendix A4 provides the results of those regressions with state 
fixed effects.  Thirty-five state fixed effects are estimated.
23  In the second stage, we then 
use those fixed effects as the dependent variable, and regress it against a series of 
variables that vary across states, but are fixed across time.  These include whether a state 
is an annual or biennial budgeter, whether the state has legislative term limits or budget 
caps, the size of the legislature, the veto override majority requirements, the standards for 
review of administrative agencies, and an index that describes the degree of 
professionalization of the legislature.  A full description of the data is provided in 
Appendix A2. 
The results of the second stage regression are found in Table 4.  Model 1 uses the 
log of per capita lobbying in a state in a year as the dependent variable, while Model 2 
uses log of total lobbying in a state in a year as the dependent variable.  The results are 
quite similar to each other, despite the fact that there are only 35 observations in both 
models.  The coefficient on Biennial is statistically significant at the 99% level in both 
specifications.  Biennial budgeting states have nearly 47% more lobbying expenditures 
(by either measure) than annual budgeting states, controlling for other effects, in budget 
years.  This prediction of the extended PWGH model seems to hold up quite well in this 
                                                 
22 It is important to note that using this data to infer about the effect of biennial budgeting assumes that the 
state fixed effect is constant across all interest groups and across time.  That is, the state fixed effect 
aggregates up to the aggregate level of lobbying expenditures in an additive way.   
23 We lose two state fixed effects when we difference the data in the first stage because of short series.   27 
data.  No other variable has a statistically significant effect at the 90% level or greater, 
except for budget caps in Model 2.   
 
*** INSERT TABLE 4 HERE *** 
 
D.  ESTIMATING THE EFFECT OF THE HOLE ON INTEREST 
GROUP PARTICIPATION 
 
  A final prediction of the PWGH model is in those off-budget years in the biennial 
states, a hole will cause less lobbying to occur because of costly movement of policy in 
off-budget years.  If we assume that that the magnitudes of the changes in θ across time 
are distributed across issue areas, and that groups are also distributed across issue areas, 
some groups in some issue areas will fall into the hole, and thus drop out of lobbying in 
off-budget years.  We can examine in the second dataset (including micro-interest group 
data of 50,000 observations) whether the number of interest groups decline in the off-
budget years, consistent with this prediction.
26 
  Our dependent variables are the total number of interest groups (Models 1 and 3) 
and the log of the number of interest groups (Models 2 and 4) with positive lobbying 
                                                 
26 A more powerful test would map the groups to the issue areas with big shifts in θ , and examine their 
lobbying behavior.  Unfortunately, in this dataset we no way of identifying which groups and issue areas 
are subjected to large shifts in θ .   28 
expenditures in a state in a year.  This yields 77 observations (12 states, each with about 
6.5 observations per year.)  Our independent variables are as before.  The results are 
presented in Table 5.  Models 1 and 2 use a levels on levels specification, while Models 3 
and 4 use a differences on differences specification.  All models have robust standard 
errors and state fixed effects. 
 
*** INSERT TABLE 5 HERE *** 
 
  The models estimate that in budget years, there are 7.9% to 16.8% (Models 1 and 
3) more interest groups participating in legislative lobbying, or 47 to 73 (Models 2 and 4) 
more interest groups.  These results are statistically significant at the 99% level in three 
specifications, and 90% level in Model 4.  The only other statistically significant effect in 
some specifications is the number of days in the regular session, which can increase the 
number of interest groups lobbying.  Each additional 10 legislative days in the regular 
session increases the number of interest groups lobbying by 2-4% (Models 1 and 3), or 2 
to 7 more interest groups enter (Models 2 and 4).   Again, the budget year effect is much 
larger than the session length effects. 
Overall, the three key predictions of the model 1) increased bias (or ideological 
distance) resulting in more lobbying, 2) biennial budgeting states having more lobbying 
in budget years, and 3) in off-budget years, there will be an increase in the number of 
interest groups, find substantial support across various specifications in the data analyzed. 
   29 
5. Discussion and Conclusion  
The results of this paper are promising for the endogenous cost lobbying models 
and models that include the signaling features of the PWGH model.  This model neatly 
captures some fundamental features of strategic information transmission: attempts to 
persuade make little sense except when a policy window is open; it is easier to persuade 
people whose biases are similar to your own; and persuasion is most important when 
policy is apt to last for a long time. The data – the most extensive yet collected on 
lobbying – seem clearly to show the fingerprints of strategic information transmission.   30 
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All graphs in 2000 constant dollars.
Figure 1:  Lobbying Expenditures in StatesFigure 2:  Lobbying as a function of biasFigure 3:  The hole in lobbyingFigure 4:  Optimal first period policyFigure 5: Optimal lobbying expendituresState








First Year Data 
Available




Alaska $9,098,812 $4,297,268 $12,200,000 1978 2004 No
Arizona** $2,371,891 $1,506,335 $3,156,176 1995 2004 No
California $161,000,000 $142,000,000 $189,000,000 1991 2003 No
Colorado $18,000,000 $17,100,000 $19,300,000 2001 2003 No
Connecticut $15,900,000 $2,624,827 $35,400,000 1978 2003 Yes
Delaware $152,093 $131,649 $177,082 2002 2004 No
Florida $4,912,494 $4,091,011 $6,818,084 1997 2001 No
Georgia $574,220 $315,283 $675,404 1997 2003 No
Hawaii $3,322,758 $2,707,086 $3,917,630 1996 2003 Yes
Idaho $408,472 $298,667 $482,954 1997 2003 No
Illinois $1,147,851 $960,528 $1,437,774 1995 2003 No
Indiana $15,500,000 $11,100,000 $19,100,000 1996 2001 Yes
Kansas $626,738 $364,223 $978,735 1975 2003 No
Kentucky** $6,785,246 $2,590,579 $9,879,419 1994 2003 Yes
Louisiana $452,757 $362,303 $681,486 1997 2003 No
Massachusetts $42,400,000 $27,100,000 $55,200,000 1995 2003 No
Maryland $19,900,000 $13,700,000 $28,500,000 1988 2003 No
Maine $3,316,610 $2,030,087 $4,420,563 1989 2003 Yes
Michigan $23,400,000 $22,300,000 $24,900,000 2001 2003 No
Minnesota*** $5,082,912 $1,070,697 $10,900,000 1980 2004 Yes
Mississippi $6,875,722 $4,331,805 $9,371,824 1995 2003 No
Montana $2,733,623 $18,255 $5,154,875 1993 2001 Yes
North Carolina $9,151,968 $7,999,181 $10,500,000 2001 2004 Yes
Nebraska $8,133,817 $6,423,631 $9,161,878 2000 2003 Yes
New Jersey $18,100,000 $14,800,000 $25,000,000 1993 2003 No
New York $42,400,000 $13,800,000 $112,000,000 1978 2003 No
Ohio $510,581 $346,473 $765,245 1999 2004 Yes
Oregon $12,900,000 $5,948,027 $20,700,000 1987 2004 Yes
Pennsylvania $48,400,000 $46,800,000 $50,100,000 2000 2001 No
South Carolina $13,900,000 $13,200,000 $14,300,000 1998 2001 No
Texas $4,792,169 $768,337 $15,000,000 1993 2001 Yes
Utah $159,194 $105,123 $245,998 1995 2003 No
Virginia $10,500,000 $8,293,575 $15,800,000 1996 2003 Yes
Vermont $4,859,556 $4,414,832 $5,182,520 1998 2004 No
Washington $29,200,000 $22,300,000 $39,000,000 1993 2004 Yes
Wisconsin $21,800,000 $18,900,000 $26,200,000 1991 2003 Yes
West Virginia $267,579 $212,544 $394,445 1992 2003 No
Wyoming $262,105 $127,916 $496,434 2000 2003 Yes
* All reports are in 2000 real dollars
**  Switched from annual to biennial or biennial to annual budgeting.
*** Has separate procedures for capital budgeting.











Budget Year 0.215*** 0.215***
(0.06) (0.06)
Session Days 0.006*** 0.006***
(0.00) (0.00)
Special Session Days 0.002 0.002
(0.00) (0.00)
Election Year -0.039 -0.039
(0.04) (0.04)
Republican Government 0.228* 0.228*
(0.13) (0.13)
Democratic Government -0.015 -0.016
(0.11) (0.11)




State Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Total R-squared 0.344 0.343
F-stat 22.968 22.937
n 352 352
Two-sided t-tests: * p<.10 ** p<.05 *** p<.01
TABLE 2:  LOBBYING IN THE STATES
Note:  Dependent variables and method used are noted.  An observation is a state-year.  Variable
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10
Distance 0.606*** 0.587*** 0.580*** 0.282** 0.324*** 0.687*** 0.682*** 0.764*** 0.611*** 0.553***
(0.18) (0.09) (0.10) (0.12) (0.13) (0.20) (0.10) (0.10) (0.12) (0.12)
Ln(Population) 0.301*** -0.001 1.881 -0.284*** -0.246** -0.248**
(0.08) (1.84) (2.35) (0.08) (0.11) (0.11)
Ln(Per Capita Income) 2.081*** 1.151** 2.466 5.448*** 5.276*** 5.301***
(0.20) (0.45) (1.55) (0.26) (0.35) (0.36)
Session Days 0.010*** 0.001 0.003 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.007***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Special Session Days 0.006*** 0.001 0.005** 0.005** 0.005** 0.007***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Constant 9.056*** 9.068*** -17.639*** -6.043 -48.613 -0.016 -0.016 -0.173*** -3.049*** -3.294***
(0.10) (0.06) (1.76) (25.27) (44.64) (0.01) (0.04) (0.04) (0.16) (0.62)
Group Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Fixed Effects No No No Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects No No No No Yes No No No No Yes
Total R-squared 0.008 0.008 0.108 0.497 0.5 0.012 0.012 0.187 0.364 0.373
F-stat 11.97 38.65 109.99 281.15 181.47 11.47 47.42 184.15 143.13 94.64
n 5,155 5,155 5,155 5,155 5,155 4,556 4,556 4,556 4,556 4,556
Two-sided t-tests: ** p<.05 *** p<.01
Note:  The sample frame is interest groups that engage in multi-state lobbying in 12 states under analysis.  The dependent variable is the log of lobbying expenditures by an interest group lobbying in a state-year.  Models 1-5 are 
level on level regression; Models 6-10 are differences on differences regressions.  Standard errors, statistical significance, and use of fixed effects are noted.  Models 1 and 6 report standard errors clustered on interest group.
Levels on Levels Differences on Differences









Budget Caps 0.237 0.243*
(0.14) (0.14)
Term Limits 0.150 0.150
(0.16) (0.16)
Total Number of Legislators 0.001 0.001
(0.00) (0.00)
Veto Override Requirement 0.501 0.543
(1.15) (1.16)
Admin Review Standard 0.029 0.031
(0.15) (0.15)






n3 5 3 5
Two-sided t-tests: ** p<.05 *** p<.01
TABLE 4:  DECOMPOSITION OF STATE FIXED EFFECTS FROM FIRST STAGE 
REGRESSIONS
Note:  The dependent variable is the state fixed effect calculated from the first stage regressions in Table A4.  Model 1 uses log of 
lobbying per capita as the dependent variable; Model 2 uses log of total lobbying per capita in the first stage regressions.  Robust 
standard errors, statistical significance, and use of fixed effects are noted.  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Dependent Variable














Budget Year 72.995*** 0.168*** 46.792*** 0.079*
(16.78) (0.05) (13.61) (0.04)
Days in Session 0.713** 0.002 1.370*** 0.004**
(0.35) (0.00) (0.39) (0.00)
Days in Special Session 0.161 0 0.095 0.001
(0.56) (0.00) (0.78) (0.00)
Election Year -6.873 -0.024 -14.717 -0.054
(11.25) (0.05) (9.55) (0.04)
Democratic Government -19.941 -0.043 -39.379 -0.118*
(30.03) (0.10) (24.29) (0.06)
Republican Government -16.837 -0.047 -3.184 0.043
(17.40) (0.05) (62.87) (0.15)
Ln(Per Capita Income) 274.107 -0.519 125.474 0.499






Constant -1,027,584.00 -3,516.14 2.45 0.008
(3,800,000.00) (15,625.82) (21.75) (0.09)
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Total R-squared 0.976 0.924 0.68 0.457
F-Stat . . 3.722 1.488
n 7 77 76 56 5
Two-sided t-tests: * p<.10 ** p<.05 *** p<.01
TABLE 5:  NUMBER OF INTEREST GROUPS LOBBYING
Note:  Dependent variables and method used are noted.  An observation is a state-year.  Firms Trade Associations Unions Membership Groups Government
Georgia $203,087 $337,992 $5,861 $14,066 $18,788
35.03% 58.30% 1.01% 2.43% 3.24%
Idaho $106,992 $248,792 $7,333 $34,038 $1,193
26.86% 62.46% 1.84% 8.54% 0.30%
Indiana $7,410,237 $5,381,184 $402,977 $479,810 $780,632
51.26% 37.23% 2.79% 3.32% 5.40%
Kentucky $3,112,450 $2,874,744 $199,902 $204,986 $147,242
47.60% 43.96% 3.06% 3.13% 2.25%
Maryland $8,629,497 $6,072,596 $254,010 $1,053,157 $179,949
53.30% 37.51% 1.57% 6.51% 1.11%
Massachusetts $24,500,000 $9,065,445 $973,783 $953,398 $520,111
68.03% 25.17% 2.70% 2.65% 1.44%
Montana $1,159,269 $1,670,386 $130,734 $313,453 $257,908
32.82% 47.30% 3.70% 8.88% 7.30%
New Jersey $14,300,000 $3,667,637 $380,041 $201,421 $0
77.09% 19.77% 2.05% 1.09% 0.00%
Oregon $4,806,318 $6,282,698 $565,691 $1,010,955 $1,192,322
34.68% 45.34% 4.08% 7.30% 8.60%
Virginia $4,281,013 $4,531,930 $108,179 $920,756 $1,049,186
39.31% 41.61% 0.99% 8.45% 9.63%
Washington $11,100,000 $9,931,242 $1,556,676 $1,502,012 $1,182,857
43.92% 39.30% 6.16% 5.94% 4.68%
Wisconsin $7,168,874 $10,200,000 $796,687 $1,478,579 $1,068,476
34.61% 49.25% 3.85% 7.14% 5.16%
TABLE A1:  TOTAL AVERAGE ANNUAL LOBBYING EXPENDITURES BY INTEREST GROUP CATEGORY
Notes:  Data is for all available years for each state.  Table A2 figures may differ from Table 1 figures because the time period covered in each table is different.  Firms and trade associations 
comprise on average 88% of lobbying expenditures in every state, and no less than 80% of lobby expenditures in any state.  Some large figures have been rounded.Ln(Lobbying Per Capita)
State Aggregate Lobbying Expenditures Divided by the Population of the State in a given year, logged 
(Ethics Commission of Each State where data is available; includes 38 states.  Most data is obtain from 
official disclosures provided.)  Population Data from Census and BEA.
Ln(Lobbying)
State Aggregate Lobbying Expenditures in a given year, logged.  (Ethics Commission of Each State where 
data is available; includes 38 states.  Most data is obtain from official disclosures provided.)
Interest Group Lobbying Data and 
Categories
For twelve states, annual lobbying expenditures by registered interest group by year.  Categorization of 
each interest group into each of five categories:  corporate, trade association, membership organization, 
union, and government; for each state for each year.  (Ethics Commission of Each State.  Most data is 
obtain from official disclosures provided. N > 50,000)
Number of Interest Groups
Number of Interest Groups with Positive Lobbying Expenditures in a State in a Year; Count is for 12 states 
with interest group data (Ethics Commission of Each State.  Count is derived from official disclosures 
provided. N > 50,000)
Ln(Number of Interest Groups)
Log of Number of Interest Groups with Positive Lobbying Expenditures in a State in a Year; Count is for 12 
states with interest group data (Ethics Commission of Each State.  Count is derived from official disclosures 
provided. N > 50,000)
Budget Year Equal to 1 if the state budget is legally mandated to be created in the year; 0 otherwise. (NCSL)
Session Days
The number of legislative days the legislature was in session in that year.  For those that reported in 
calendar days, we divided the number of calendar days by 2.5 to retrieve an approximate number of 
legislative days.  This ratio was determined from a subset of data where both total days and legislative days 
were reported for the same state-year.  Session Dummy is a dummy variable = 1 if the legislature is in 
regular session and 0 otherwise (Book of the States)
Special Session Days
The number of legislative days the legislature was in session in that year.  For those that reported in 
calendar days, we divided the number of calendar days by 2.5 to retrieve an approximate number of 
legislative days.  This ratio was determined from a subset of data where both total days and legislative days 
were reported for the same state-year.  Special Session Dummy is a dummy variable = 1 if the legislature is 
in regular session and 0 otherwise (Book of the States)
Election Year Equal to 1 if the legislature holds regularly scheduled election in that year; = 0 otherwise (NCSL)
Republican Government
Equal to 1 when the Republican Party holds the governorship, state senate, and state house; = 0 otherwise 
(Book of the States)
Democratic Government
Equal to 1 when the Democratic Party holds the governorship, state senate, and state house; = 0 otherwise 
(Book of the States)
Ln(Per Capita Income)
Log of Per Capita Personal Income of the State in a given year (Bureau of Economic Analysis, Department 
of Commerce (BEA))
Ln(Population) Log of Population of the State (Census and BEA)
Year Year
Biennial Equal to 1 if a state budgets biennially; = 0 otherwise (NCSL)
Budget Caps Equal to 1 if the state has budget caps; =0 otherwise (Primo, 2003)
Term Limits Equal to 1 if the state has legislative term limits; = 0 otherwise (Primo and Milyo 2004)
Total Number of Legislators The total number of legislators in the state senate and house combined (Book of the States)
Veto Override Requirement
The percentage of legislators that must vote for an override of the governor's veto in a given state (Book of 
the States)
Admin Review Standard
Equal to 1 if a statute must be passed to override a regulatory agency in the state; = 0 otherwise (Book of 
the States)
Professionalization Index
A measure of the degree of professionalization of the legislature.  This measure is comprised of a rating of 
the length of the sessions of the legislature, the compensation of legislators, and the amount of staff they 
have.  (Kurtz, NCSL)
Distance
A measure of the ideological distance of the interest group to the median of the government.  It is = 1 if the 
interest group is a firm (union), and there is Democratic (Republican) unified government.  It is = .5 if the 
interest group is a firm (union), and there is divided government.  It is equal to 0 if the interest group is a firm 
(union) and there is Republican (Democratic) unified government.
TABLE A2:  VARIABLE DEFINITIONS AND SOURCESModel 1 Model 2
Dependent Variable Ln(Lobbying) Ln(Lobbying)






Session Days 0.014*** 0.004***
(0.00) (0.00)








Group Fixed Effects yes yes
State Fixed Effects no no
Year Fixed Effects yes yes
Total R-squared 0.127 0.394
F-stat 50.99 197.401
n 5,155 5,155
Two-sided t-tests: *** p<.01
TABLE A3:  ESTIMATION OF THEORETICAL EQUATION (1)
Note:  If one were to attempt to nearly structurally estimate Equation (1) of the theoretical section, the regression equation would 











Ln(Per Capita Income) 0.5969 0.6359
(0.69) (0.70)
Days in Session 0.0005 0.0005
(0.00) (0.00)
Days in Special Session -0.0006 -0.0006
(0.00) (0.00)
Election Year -0.0272 -0.0270
(0.02) (0.02)
Republican Unified Govt 0.1730** 0.1735**
(0.07) (0.07)




State Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Total R-squared 0.1057 0.1028
F-stat 1.66 1.66
n 278 278
Two-sided t-tests: ** p<.05 *** p<.01
TABLE A4:  FIRST-STAGE REGRESSION ON STATE BUDGETING YEARS ONLY
Note:  The dependent variable in Model 1 is the log of total aggregate lobbying expenditures per capita in the state in a 
year.  The dependent variable in Model 2 is the log of total aggregate lobbying expenditures in the state in a year.  















Levels on Levels 
(Only Stationary 
States)


















Budget Year 0.356*** 0.356*** 0.320*** 0.323*** 0.302*** 0.310*** 0.173*** 0.173***
(0.12) (0.12) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.09) (0.05) (0.05)
Session Days 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003* 0.003*
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Session Dummy 1.044*** 1.043***
(0.09) (0.09)
Special Session Days 0.006* 0.006* 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Special Session Dummy 0.057 0.056
(0.04) (0.04)
Election Year 0.015 0.019 -0.014 -0.017 -0.019 -0.010 -0.04 -0.04
(0.08) (0.08) (0.05) (0.05) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
Republican Government 0.311** 0.300** 0.032 0.032 -0.018 -0.043 0.229** 0.229**
(0.14) (0.14) (0.09) (0.09) (0.18) (0.14) (0.11) (0.11)
Democratic Government -0.002 -0.02 -0.111* -0.115* -0.113* -0.177** -0.01 -0.011
(0.09) (0.09) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.09) (0.09)
Ln(Per Capita Income) 0.917 0.928 0.894*** 1.061*** 1.517** 1.591** 1.587 1.612






Constant -1.21e+04* -1.22e+04* -9.074*** 4.227*** -0.032* -0.024 -0.045 -0.036
(6386.13) (6396.06) (0.88) (0.88) (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.05)
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Total R-squared 0.44 0.47 .... 0.48 0.48
F-stat 12.91 14.60 27.50 34.32 . . 40.64 40.61
n 178.00 178.00 352.00 352.00 313.00 313.00 351.00 351.00
Two-sided t-tests: * p<.10 ** p<.05 *** p<.01
REFEREE TABLE R1:  ROBUSTNESS CHECKS OF LOBBYING IN THE STATES
Note:  Dependent variables and method used are noted.  An observation is a state-year.    32 
Mathematical Appendix 
 
In this Appendix we provide details of the two-period game.  
The Government’s Policy Making 
The utility function for an unbiased government is: 
() ( ) ∫ ∫ − − − − −
θ θ




1 1                             (A1) 
Where ) (θ I is an indicator variable taking the value 0 if  1 2 p p = and 1 otherwise. 
Although this appears rather complicated, it actually breaks down into four somewhat 
simpler cases. 
Case 1: High k  
Assume  {} 1 1 2 1 , max p p k − > . So even if the initial policy is set to the level associated 
with  1 θ   = 0 or 1 and the SIG subsequently indicates a new theta at 1 or 0, respectively, G 
won’t change the initial policy. In this case (A1) becomes  
() ( ) ∫ − − − −
θ




1 1  






1 1 − − − − − mean p p θ θ  










θ + .  
Combining this result with the requirement that  { } 1 1 2 1 , max p p k − >  results in the top, 
v-shaped line in Figures 5 and 6 (Region I). We regard this scenario as very unlikely 
because it implies no lobbying in the second period.    33 
 
 
Case 2: Low or moderate k and moderate  1 θ  
Assume a low value for k and a moderate  1 θ  and the policy maker sets a moderate initial 
policy.  Then, in the second period, he modifies this moderate policy only if he learns the 
new theta is quite far away (low or high) from the initial moderate policy (Figure 4 
represents this scenario.) This scenario requires  k p k − < < 1 1  (otherwise, the 
policymaker will never modify the initial policy regardless of the values of  2 θ  on one 
end of the spectrum or the other). Given these assumptions, (A1) becomes: 






1 1 k p k k p k d f p p
k p
k p
− − − − − − − − − ∫
+
−
θ θ θ θ  







1 1 k k
k
p p M − − − − − − − θ θ  
Where  1 p M = θ , so 
=  () ) 2 1 (
3
2
1 1 k k
k
p − − − − − θ  
Clearly optimal  1 1 θ = p . This solution requires  k k − < < 1 1 θ , which yields the lower 
peaked line in Figures 5 and 6 (Region II).   
 
Case 3. Moderate k and low  1 θ   
Assume  2 1 k p <  (so the policy maker does not change the initial policy if 
k p + < 1 2 θ ) but  1 2 1 < + k p  (that is,  2 1 1 k p − < ) so it does change the initial policy 
if  k p + > 1 2 θ . That is, the “hole” in Figure 4 lies at the left-hand side of the figure.   34 
Then equation (A1) becomes: 









1 1 k k p k p p k p p M − − − + ⎥ ⎦
⎤
⎢ ⎣
⎡ + − − − + + − − θ θ  
M θ , the expected value of theta conditional on being within  k distance of  1 p  (that is, 
lying between 0 and  k p + 1 ), is 
2
1 k p +
. Given this objective function, some algebra 
shows that the best  1 p  is  1 2 1 1 2 − + + θ k . From the above discussion, if  k >.5 we 











⎛ − ≤ ⇒ θ k . But if  k <.5 we require  
1 2 1 1 2 − + + θ k k ≤
2 θ > ⇒ k . This yields the scalloped portion on the left of Figures 5 
and 6 (Region III).  
 
Case 4. Moderate k and high  1 θ  
Now consider the mirror case, on the high side. In this case, given a high  1 θ , the policy 
maker set a rather high  1 p , which he retains in the second period unless  2 θ is quite low. 
In terms of constraints, this case requires  k k p − ≥ 1 , 1 . The first of these will bind if 
5 . > k , the second if  5 . < k . Expected utility is  




















= θ . Some algebra shows that the optimal θ 2 3 2 1 − + − = k p . 
This yields the lower portion in the center of Figures 5 and 6 (Region IV).  
   35 
Lobbying Expenditure Functions 
Case 1: High k  
In this case, the expected utility function for the SIG is: 
() ( ) ∫ − − − − − − −
θ

























= . Let µ denote G’s beliefs about  1 θ . Then the marginal gain to 








































=  µ θ δ − − 1 2  
At  1 θ µ = , this is just  δ 2 , which must equal the marginal cost of lobbying. Integrating 
over  1 θ  yields  1 1 1 2 ) ( δθ θ = l , which is just the solution to the one-period game. 
 
Case 2: Low or moderate k and moderate  1 θ  
For the SIG, expected period 2 utility (given the equilibrium strategies in period 2) is: 













) ( ) 2 ( ) ( ) 2 ( ) (
k p
k p k p
k p
d f d f d f p θ θ δθ δ θ θ δθ δ θ θ δ θ  
That is, the expected loss if  2 θ lies in the hole, with no lobbying if that happens; minus 
what the SIG gets if  2 θ lies below the hole, including the associated lobbying cost; minus 
what the SIG gets if  2 θ lies above the hole, including the associated lobbying cost. But 





− −δ  (this is because the   36 





− − δ δ  (the SIG definitely gets 
2 δ − , minus the expected cost of lobbying). 




2 k p+ +
− − δ δ . Putting all three pieces together, and taking into account the 




δ δ δ + − + − p k
k
. Thus the SIG’s two period 
utility function is: 
()
2 / 3




) 1 ( 4 k k p l p − − − + − − − − δ δ δ δ θ  
Using the same methods as in the previous case yields the first period lobbying function: 
( ) 2 1 1 1 2 1 2 ) ( k l + = δθ θ . 
 
Case 3. Moderate k and low  1 θ   
The SIG’s 2 period expected utility function is: 
() () ∫ ∫
+
+










) ( ) 2 ( ) (
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d f d f p l p θ θ δθ δ θ θ δ θ δ θ  



















− − δ .  The fourth term occurs with probability  k p − − 1 1 
and is composed of two parts: 




1 k p + +
δ . Given these facts, the SIG’s utility function may be re-written as    37 
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2
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k p k p
k p k l p δ θ δ θ  
( )( ) ) 1 ( 1 1
2
1 k p k p + + − − − − + δ δ  
Recall from above that G sets  1 2 1 2 1 − + + = µ k p , where µ denotes G’s beliefs about 
1 θ . Some algebra shows that the marginal gain to the SIG of higher beliefs by G about  1 θ  
is: 
µ
µ δ µ θ δ δ
2 1
2 1 4 2 2 2 2
+ +
+ + + − + + − −
k
k k k
, which at  θ µ =  is 
θ
θ δ δ δ
2 1
2 1 4 2 2
+ +
+ + + + − −
k
k k k
. This must equal the marginal cost of lobbying, 
implying (using integration) that  = ) , , ( 2 1 1 δ θ k l  
( ) ) 2 1 ( 2 2 1 2 2 θ δ θ δ δ + + + + + − + − k k k k . This appears rather complicated; but it is 
easy to see that in fact it is  ε δ δ δ θ + + = 2 2 1 1 2 2 ) , , ( k k l , 
where ε is a (complicated) expression involving  1 θ . In other words, expenditure involves 
bias, an interaction term between high cost and bias, and a heteroskedastic error term. 
 
Case 4. Moderate k and high  1 θ   
This case is similar to Case 3; accordingly we are brief. The SIG’s expected utility 
function is: 
() () ∫ ∫
−
−
+ − − − − − − − −
k p
k p







1 1 ) ( ) 2 ( ) ( θ θ δθ δ θ θ δ θ δ θ  
Which is:   38 
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k p δ δ  
Recalling that  θ 2 3 2 1 − + − = k p , an analysis exactly like that in Case 3 yields 
= ) , , ( 2 1 1 δ θ k l ( ) ) 2 3 ( 2 2 3 2 4 1 2 1 2 2 2 θ δ θ δ δ − − − − + + − − k k k k . Again, this appears 
complicated but it will be seen that is:  = ) , , ( 2 1 1 δ θ k l 2 2 6 k δ δ ς − − , where ς  is a 
complicated expression involving  1 θ . 
 
 
 
 
 
 